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Abstract—The past years have seen increasing cooperation between psychology and computer science in the field of
computational modeling of emotion. However, to realize its potential, the exchange between the two disciplines, as well as the
intradisciplinary coordination, should be further improved. We make three proposals for how this could be achieved. The proposals
refer to: 1) systematizing and classifying the assumptions of psychological emotion theories; 2) formalizing emotion theories in
implementation-independent formal languages (set theory, agent logics); and 3) modeling emotions using general cognitive
architectures (such as Soar and ACT-R), general agent architectures (such as the BDI architecture) or general-purpose affective agent
architectures. These proposals share two overarching themes. The first is a proposal for modularization: deconstruct emotion theories
into basic assumptions; modularize architectures. The second is a proposal for unification and standardization: Translate different
emotion theories into a common informal conceptual system or a formal language, or implement them in a common architecture.
Index Terms—Computational emotion modeling, affective computing, emotion theories, theory formalization, agent logics, cognitive
architectures
1 COMPUTATIONAL MODELING OF EMOTION AS AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT
1.1 Definition and Aims of Computational Modeling
of Emotion
AS used in this paper, computational modeling of emotionrefers to attempts to develop and validate computa-
tional models of human emotion mechanisms. Computa-
tional modeling of emotion is an interdisciplinary endeavor
between, in particular, psychology and computer science
[135]. The goals of computational modeling of emotion
largely correspond to the general goals of AI (e.g., [134]),
when these are restricted to the domain of emotions:
To achieve a better theoretical understanding of emotions
in natural (specifically human) and artificial agents by
creating computational models of them; and to enrich the
architecture of artificial agents with emotion mechanisms
similar to those of humans, and thus with the capacity to
“have” emotions.1 Computational emotion modeling pro-
jects that have the first goal can be called theoretical and
those that have the second goal applied [31]. Psychologists
are typically more interested in theoretical and computer
scientists in applied computational emotion modeling;
however, some researchers in both disciplines pursue both
goals. In fact, the two goals are closely linked: Endowing
artificial agents with truly human-like emotion mechanisms
presupposes reasonably faithful computational models of
these mechanisms (e.g., [68]); conversely, one (some would
say the best) way to attain a deep theoretical understanding
of mental processes, including emotions, is to try to
synthesize them in artificial agents (e.g., [25]).2
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1. Based on a functionalist view of mental states (e.g., [24]), we propose
to understand this capacity as the capacity of artificial agents to have
internal states that are functionally equivalent or at least similar to emotions
in humans, i.e., that play causal roles in the agent architecture that mimic
those played by emotions in humans. The causal effects of emotions that can
be modeled in artificial agents include self-awareness of emotions when
they occur (e.g., [20], [135]); however, no claim is made that artificial agents,
at least those that currently exist, are conscious of their emotions in the
sense of having qualitative phenomenal experiences (see [154]).
2. An additional goal of affective computing is to provide artificial agents
with a theory of mind module that allows them to recognize, explain,
predict, and conceive of ways to influence, the emotions of other agents
([135]; see also [152]). Computational models of emotion can be helpful for
this purpose, too: Declarative versions of these models (possibly in a
simplified form) can be used as components of the theory-of-mind module
of artificial agents; alternatively or in addition, agents can be programmed
to use their emotion mechanisms in “simulation mode” to predict the
emotions of others (as well as their own) (as realized, for example, in
Pynadath and Marsella’s [139] PsychSim agent).
The close connection between theoretical and applied
computational emotion modeling is one reason why the
past years have seen increasing cooperation between
psychology and computer science in research on emotions
(see, e.g., [11], [78], [168]). Some see in this development a
revival of the cognitive revolution of the 1960s (e.g., [116],
[119]) in the cloak of affect [67]. While this may seem to be a
grand claim, there is at least one sense in which it seems
justified: Because emotions are thought to be primarily
useful for resource-bounded autonomous agents acting in
dynamic and only partially known environments (e.g.,
[118], [135], [100], [179]), the computational modeling of
emotion requires returning to the original goal of artificial
intelligence to create “complete” artificial agents (see, e.g.,
[89], [164]); and likewise, a refocusing on the original goal of
cognitive science, to create a unified theory of the mind
[121]. The cooperation between psychology and computer
science in the field of emotion therefore has the potential to
contribute to unification, not only in emotion psychology,
but in psychology at large.
1.2 Realizing the Potential of Computational
Emotion Modeling
However, to realize its potential, the exchange between as
well as the coordination within the two disciplines should
be further improved. As to the interdisciplinary exchange,
the export of theories has so far been mainly from
psychology to affective computing, rarely in the reverse
direction (see [31]). For example, as Broekens [31] notes,
the Handbook of Emotions [94], a standard psychological
reference work on emotions, contains virtually no citations
to the affective computing literature. This is so despite the
fact 1) that psychologists frequently emphasize the need to
better understand the computational mechanisms under-
lying emotions (e.g., [167]) and 2) that at least some of the
emotion models developed by computer scientists can
claim to be serious candidates for computational theories
of human emotion, or at least to elucidate and concretize
the psychological theories on which they are based (for
supportive evidence see Sections 3 and 4, and [31], [108]).
Concerning the intradisciplinary situation, both disciplines
could profit from more comparative efforts, coordination,
systematization, and focus. Within affective computing
research, there are now numerous computational models
of emotions (for overviews, see, e.g., [78], [108]), but this
work is rarely cumulative or even comparative; rather, as
noted by Marsella et al. [108], different researchers have
tended to start anew from the same or different psycho-
logical sources (for notable exceptions, see [27], [53]). Partly
as a consequence, the theoretical landscape in affective
computing increasingly resembles that in the psychology
of emotion, where numerous psychological theories of
emotion coexist side by side (see, e.g., [155], [167]), with
few attempts to integrate or even to systematically
compare them (for an exception, see [148]). From the
psychologist’s perspective, affective computing researchers
may even seem to further contribute to theoretical
fragmentation by developing different computational
models of the same psychological theory (as documented,
for example, by the many implementations of the OCC
theory of emotion [129]).
1.3 Aims and Overview of This Paper
Our aim in this paper is tomake several proposals for further
improving the interdisciplinary exchange between, aswell as
the intradisciplinary coordination within, psychology and
artificial intelligence research in the domain of emotion
modeling. A complementary perspective—in the form of a
set of guidelines for prospective computational emotion
modelers—is provided by Hudlicka [80]. In Section 2, we
make proposals for systematizing the psychological theories
of emotion that typically serve as blueprints for creating
computational emotion models. These proposals can also be
helpful for systematizing and comparing existing computa-
tional emotion models. In Section 3, we discuss possibilities
of formalizing psychological (and philosophical) emotion
theories in implementation-independent formal languages.
Again, these languages can also be useful for formalizing
(at least part of) the assumptions of existing computational
models. In Section 4, we consider options for modeling
emotions in existing, comparatively general-purpose cogni-
tive and agent architectures, including general-purpose
affective agent architectures. Due mainly to the composition
of the group of authors, our discussion focuses on symbolic
models of psychological (specifically cognitive) emotion
theories.3 Hence, we ignore the computational modeling of
neurophysiological emotion theories (e.g., [8]) as well as
attempts to implement psychological emotion theories in
subsymbolic neural networks (e.g., [12]). Note, however, that
the symbolic modeling of psychological emotion theories is
by far the dominant approach in the field of computational
modeling of emotion [78], [108].
2 SYSTEMATIZING PSYCHOLOGICAL EMOTION
THEORIES
2.1 The Situation in Emotion Psychology
From the perspective of an applied affective computing
researcher, psychology would ideally be at an advanced
stage where the ultimate correct theory of emotion (UCTE) or
even better, the ultimate unified theory of the mind (UUTM)
had been attained. Furthermore, that theory would ideally
be formulated as a computational model, or would at least
be available in a format that lends itself readily to
implementation as a computer program. Unfortunately,
psychology has not yet arrived at this stage. First, there is
not one emotion theory; there are many theories: Strongman
[190] lists no less than 150 psychological and philosophical
emotion theories that have been proposed during history,
and these are still not all. To be sure, some of these
“theories” are no more than vague hypotheses, there is
much redundancy, and many theories are of historical
interest only. However, even if one restricts attention to the
currently discussed emotion theories, many do remain (e.g.,
[80], [155], [167]). Making matters worse, the exact relations
between the different emotion theories are sometimes
difficult to judge even by experts. Second, the existing
3. Although the views expressed in this paper mostly reflect a majority
consensus, agreement among all authors on all points is not implied.
However, considering the many issues discussed in this paper and the
different backgrounds and theoretical predilections of the authors, it was
encouraging to see how much agreement could be achieved.
psychological emotion theories are not formulated as
computational models and most are not described in a
sufficiently precise and complete way to be directly
implemented as computer programs.4
Theoretical fragmentation and a comparative lack of
precision are not peculiar to emotion psychology but are by
and large characteristic of psychology in general. Psychol-
ogists often excuse these problems of their field by pointing
to the complexity of psychology’s subject matter and the
comparatively young age of psychology as a science. There
is truth to these claims. However, there are also other
reasons for the present state of psychology: Partly as an
aftereffect of the behavioristic phase in psychology (about
1920-1960) with its associated positivist philosophy of
science, a premium is still placed in today’s psychology
on empirical as compared to theoretical research [177].5
Furthermore, novelty and surprisingness of claims and
findings are honored more than are attempts to integrate
and unify. The recent interaction between psychology and
computer science in the field of emotion has created a need
to provide concise and precise summaries of psychological
theories to nonspecialists who are at the same time
accustomed to a high degree of precision. This need could
provide an impetus to psychologists to try to clean up and
organize their theoretical landscape. In this, they can be
helped by computer scientists and logicians (see [41], [80],
and Section 3).
2.2 Toward Systematization and Unification in
Emotion Psychology
There are several, not necessarily exclusive ways how this
aim could be achieved. One possibility is to systematically
reconstruct the existing emotion theories; possibly using a
formal language (e.g., [204]; see Section 3 for more
details). However, this approach, although appropriate
for selected theories of particular importance, is probably
too cumbersome as a general strategy. Not every theory
needs to be precisely reconstructed; in particular, it is not
necessary to formalize theories that have turned out to be
(or at least, most likely are) false. One should focus on
the promising alternatives.
An alternative, quicker and more viable strategy may be
to 1) break up existing emotion theories into their
component assumptions and 2) reformulate these assump-
tions in a common conceptual framework (e.g., [80], [108],
[147]). This common framework could be a formal
language, possibly enriched with a set of special concepts
(e.g., belief and desire) or it could be a general-purpose
cognitive architecture (see Sections 3 and 4); however,
already semiformal or informal theory reconstructions can
significantly contribute to clarification and unification if
concepts are used in a clear and consistent way [41]. The
ultimate aim of this second strategy would be to reduce the
many existing emotion theories to a smaller (hopefullymuch
smaller) set of basic assumptions. These building blocks of
emotion theories can then be separately discussed and
refined. Furthermore, similar assumptions of different
emotion theories can be more easily compared, vague
assumptions can be more easily clarified, and conflicting
assumptions more easily identified, when they are recast in
a common conceptual framework (see also, Section 3 and 4).
In the remainder of Sections 2, we make proposals for
breaking up and organizing the assumptions of emotion
theories in a principled way. These proposals derive from a
reflection on the basic task of emotion psychology. The
mainstream position in today’s psychology, at least its
cognitive branch—which is not only compatible with, but in
fact rests on, a computational view of the mind (see
footnote 4)—conceives of humans as autonomous cognitive
systems, or intelligent agents, whose basic architecture
emerged in evolution, but is significantly elaborated and
possibly even transformed, by individual and cultural
learning. This theoretical perspective implies that, to explain
human behavior and experience, it is necessary to decode
the structure and functioning of the human information
processing system. For emotion psychology, this means that
its central task is to reverse-engineer the structure and
functioning of the human emotion system, including its
connections to other subsystems of the mind (e.g., [155]; as
mentioned in Section 1.1, to understand emotions, it may in
fact be necessary to reconstruct significant parts of the
whole cognitive architecture). As already emphasized by
McDougall [110], the task of reverse-engineering the
emotion system comprises identifying the inherited versus
acquired components of the emotion system.
2.2.1 On the Definition of Emotion
Before proceeding, a note on the concept of emotion is in
order. Just as there is at present no generally accepted theory
of emotion, there is currently no generally accepted
definition of emotion—at least if by that one means a
specification of the singularly necessary and jointly suffi-
cient features of emotion. Causal-role functionalism about
mental states ([24], footnote 1) suggests that the latter is a
direct consequence of the former [149], [157]. According to
functionalism, mental states are defined (at least in part) in
terms of their causal-functional role in the mental economy.
Because this role is specified by a theory of emotion, a
precise definition of emotion can only be given in the
context of an emotion theory that is presupposed as correct.
Hence, a precise definition of emotion is necessarily a
theoretical (theory-based) definition. In addition, because a
theoretical definition of emotion stands or falls with the
emotion theory that it presupposes, it is not a linguistic
convention or stipulation about the use of the term
“emotion,” but an empirical hypothesis about the nature
of emotions [149], [157].
However, a precise definition of emotion is not needed to
conduct meaningful research on emotions. All that is
needed for this purpose is a rough, preliminary demarca-
tion of the object domain “emotion”—what can be called a
4. This is actually surprising if one considers that, since the cognitive
revolution of the 1960s, the psychological mainstream (at least in cognitive
psychology) subscribes officially to the “information processing paradigm”,
that takes information processing in computers as the guiding metaphor for
understanding mental processes in humans. According to the information-
processing paradigm, the task of (cognitive) psychology is to reconstruct the
“rules and representations” that underlie mental processes [131]. In
practice, however, the development of theories of mental processes that
fully meet this description (i.e., computational models) in psychology is still
restricted to a comparatively small community of experts (see, e.g., [191] for
an overview) and only very few of them are working on computational
models of emotion.
5. One indicator of this “bias for the empirical” is that, different from
most other sciences, psychology has no official theoretical branch: There is
no official subdiscipline called Theoretical Psychology [177].
working definition of emotion [149], [157]. Minimally, such a
working definition is already provided by a list of typical
examples of emotion. We believe that, despite their
differences of opinion regarding the true nature or correct
theoretical definition of emotions, most emotion researchers
are by and large in agreement on such a list. That is, most
emotion researchers would agree among themselves, as
well as with lay persons, that the objects of their inquiry
comprise, centrally, those mental (or perhaps mental-
behavioral) states of humans that in common language
are denoted by words such as “joy,” “sadness,” “fear,”
“anger,” “pity,” “pride,” and so on. Beyond this, a working
definition of emotion can include those features of emotion
that are largely uncontroversial and, therefore, do not imply
a decision for or against a particular emotion theory.
Although there is perhaps no feature of emotion that has
not been questioned by one or the other theorist, it is widely
accepted 1) that emotional states (joy, fear, etc.) are
normally reactions to the perception, imagination or
thought of certain things (typically events or states of
affairs); and 2) that emotions have characteristic subjective
as well as objective aspects. Subjectively, emotions manifest
themselves, centrally, in characteristic phenomenal experi-
ences or feelings, that appear to be directed at their eliciting
objects: For example, one feels happy about the arrival of a
friend, or experiences surprise about the election victory of
a political party. Objectively, emotions manifest themselves
at least occasionally in certain characteristic actions (e.g.,
flight or avoidance in the case of fear), expressive reactions
(e.g., smiling in joy), and physiological changes (e.g., a rise
of blood pressure in anger).
Although the proposed working definition of emotion is
necessarily fuzzy, this is no objection to it. Just as providing
a precise definition of emotions is the result rather than the
precondition of theorizing about emotions, so too is
providing a sharp demarcation of the domain of emotions,
as well as a principled taxonomy of emotions (see also
[129], [150]).
In this paper, we will, however, make one additional
assumption about emotions: We will assume that whatever
emotions are more precisely, they are mental states which
are caused by, and in turn cause, other mental states and
behaviors. Harmless and even self-evident as this assump-
tion may seem to some readers, it is (at first sight at least) in
conflict with those emotion theories that view emotions as
response syndromes including both mental and behavioral
components (e.g., [92], [166]; see [149] for a discussion).
However, the syndrome theories, too, assume a generating
process that maps (representations of) objects or events into
one or several emotion-specific mental states (e.g., apprai-
sals, bodily feelings, action tendencies), which then,
singularly or in combination, influence further cognitive
processes and behavior. With respect to the syndrome
theories, our term “emotion” refers to the emotion-specific
internal states assumed in these theories.
2.2.2 Reverse-Engineering the Emotion System:
“Horizontal” and “Vertical” Task Divisions
The task of emotion psychology—the reverse-engineering
of the emotion system—can be broken down both
“horizontally” and “vertically”: Horizontally, by following
the temporal and causal flow of information from the
perception (or an internally generated representation) of an
eliciting object to emotion, and from there to the cognitive
and behavioral effects of emotion; vertically, by studying
the emotion system at different levels of analysis. In
particular, one can focus on either the “intentional level”
of system analysis or on the “design level” (Dennett, [51];
similar distinctions have been drawn by Marr [106] between
the computational and algorithmic level, and by Newell
[122] between the knowledge level and the symbol level).
The proposed horizontal division suggests three main
questions for emotion psychology: 1) How are emotions
generated? 2) What are their effects on subsequent cognitive
processes and behaviors? and 3) related to both 1 and 2 (see
below), what is the nature of the emotion itself? ([80], [108],
[155], see Section 2.2.1).
The vertical division, between the intentional and the
design level of system analysis, separates 1) theoretical
descriptions of emotion processes in terms of what are
ultimately common-sense psychological concepts (percep-
tion, belief, desire, intention, fear, hope, etc.) from 2) theories
that (also) refer to the internal representations (sentences in
a language of thought, images, subsymbolic signals, etc.)
and computations on these representations, that according
to the computational view of the mind underlie the
intentional-level phenomena [51]. The term “intentional”
in Dennett’s distinction expresses the idea that intentional-
level theories explain the behavior of a system by attribut-
ing to it intentional (meaning here: representational) mental
states familiar from common-sense psychology, such as
beliefs and desires (e.g., [70], [171]): Internal system states
that refer to or represent aspects of the world, including the
own system, in particular ways (e.g., as being true in the
case of belief, or as to-be-made true if possible in the case of
desire). In adopting the “intentional stance” toward a
system [51], we assume—either seriously or only as an
“as-if” explanatory strategy—that the behavior of the
system is controlled by representational mental states of
this kind [70], [171].6
Simple as it is, the proposed classification scheme brings
several important facts about psychological emotion the-
ories into focus. Concentrating on the vertical division
between the intentional and the design level of system
analysis brings out that, as already mentioned, the majority
of the existing psychological emotion theories are formu-
lated on the intentional level (e.g., “fear is experienced if the
person believes that an undesired event might occur”).
Nevertheless, it should be noted that some psychological
emotion theories (e.g., [62], [151], [166], [181]) provide at
least sketches of the computational processes assumed to
underlie the intentional-level phenomena. That is, whereas
“pure” intentional-level theories of emotion only describe
inputs and outputs of presumed mental computations,
these “process theories” also make some assumptions about
the computational processes that transform inputs into
outputs (e.g., the nature of the underlying representations,
6. Note that the distinction between the intentional and the design
level is orthogonal to the distinction between deliberate/conscious and
automatic/unconscious mental processes referred to later in our discus-
sion of cognitive versus noncognitive emotion elicitation. Both deliberate/
conscious and automatic/unconscious emotion generation processes can
in principle involve folk-psychological mental states such as beliefs and
desires (e.g., [33]); and both processes can also be described in terms of
representations and computations.
the identity and sequence of the involved subprocesses; see
[147]). As such, these process theories can play the role of
intermediaries between intentional-level theories of emo-
tion and full-fledged computational theories [32], [100].
Other important facts about emotion theories become
transparent if one focuses on the proposed horizontal
division, the flow of processing. First, quite a few
historically important and contemporary emotion theories
are primarily concerned with the question of the nature of
emotion and say comparatively little (at least little specific)
about how the different emotions are produced, and what
useful or other effects they have (see [154]). These theories
include James’s [82] theory of emotion and neo-Jamesian
emotion theories (e.g., [86]); cognition-arousal theory [16],
[101], [165] and “dimensional” emotion theories such as the
pleasure-arousal model [144], [162], [163]. The question that
these theories mainly seek to answer is what kind of mental
states emotions are, which is interpreted as meaning: From
which building blocks, if any, emotions are constructed,
and how they fit into a general taxonomy of mental states.
Specifically, are emotions mental states sui generis (e.g.,
centrally generated feelings of pleasure and displeasure) or
can they be reduced, at least in part, to known mental states
(e.g., feelings of bodily changes, a combination of cognitions
and bodily feelings, patterns of appraisal or of beliefs and
desires, or felt action tendencies; see [154])? Theorists
interested in these questions have typically proceeded on
the assumption that they can be answered without detailed
theories of the generation and the effects of emotion
(although some causal assumptions seem unavoidable).
However, because of their restricted focus, the resulting
theories of the nature of emotion are alone insufficient as
psychological foundations of computational emotion mod-
els; they must be combined with theories of the elicitation
and the effects of emotions. This becomes evident, at the
latest, when one tries to use these theories to construct
emotion mechanisms for artificial agents. For example,
Becker-Asano and Wachsmuth [20] have implemented a
version of the pleasure-arousal theory of emotion in an
artificial agent; however, to account for the generation of
emotions, they found it necessary to enrich pleasure-arousal
theory with the OCC theory [129].
Second, even theories that are quite specific about
emotion generation (in particular, some cognitive emotion
theories) are sometimes relatively silent about the effects of
emotions (see [80]). Again, if these theories are to be used as
starting points for creating emotion mechanisms for
artificial agents—which are usually desired because one
hopes that they will enhance the functioning of the agents in
some way—they must be enriched with assumptions about
the effects of emotions (see, e.g., [20], [68], [53]).
Interestingly, most theories of emotion generation seem
to be compatible with rather different assumptions about the
nature of emotions and their effects. For example, different
cognitive emotion theorists have proposed that emotions are
bodily feelings, feelings of pleasure-displeasure, mixtures of
pleasure-displeasure and activation-deactivation, felt action
tendencies, evaluative beliefs, patterns of belief and desire,
various combinations of these states, and even syndromes
including both mental and bodily reactions (see Sec-
tion 2.1.1). Likewise, most theories of emotion generation
seem to be compatible, in principle, with a variety of
hypotheses about how emotions influence subsequent
cognitive processes and actions: by creating hedonistic
desires, by creating nonhedonistic action tendencies, by
focusing attention or shifting goal priorities, and so on (see
Section 2.2.4). Furthermore, most cognitive theories of
emotion generation seem equally compatible with a highly
modular, “discrete emotions” view of the emotion system
(e.g., [92], [161]) and with a fairly domain-general view
(e.g., [150], [151], [163]). The compatibility of the assump-
tions of different emotion theories about the generation,
nature, and effects of emotions may seem desirable from an
engineering perspective, but it can be argued that it actually
reveals a weakness of the respective emotion theories:
Apparently, they are unable to impose strong constraints on
what goes with what.7
2.2.3 Classifying Theories of Emotion Elicitation
Cognitive versus noncognitive theories of emotion. The assump-
tions of the different existing psychological (and philosophi-
cal) emotion theories about the process of emotion elicitation
can be classified into two main groups, “cognitive” and
“noncognitive.” Although the usefulness of this distinction
has been questioned because of the vagueness and ambiguity
of the term “cognitive,” it seems that a meaningful dividing
line can still be drawn as follows: Cognitive theories assume
that emotions (or at least a core subset of emotions) require
certain “higher-order” mental representations, in particular,
they require what are commonsensically called beliefs and
desires [70], [111].8 In their more extreme forms, cognitive
theories of emotion even assume that emotions are a form of
cognition (e.g., evaluative beliefs, or belief-desire com-
pounds), or contain beliefs or belief-desire compounds as
essential components (see [37], [153], [154]). In contrast,
“noncognitive” emotion theories assume that 1) certain kinds
of emotions in a broad sense (e.g., sensory affects such as the
hedonic pleasure evoked by the smell of a rose), or even 2)
some prototypical emotions such as fear, are always (sensory
affects) or at least sometimes (fear) elicited by stimuli via a
more direct route, that circumvents the mentioned higher
cognitive processes. According to the most interesting
interpretation of this hypothesis (e.g., [82], [128]), this
“noncognitive” pathway involves only nonpropositional and
possibly even nonconceptual mental representations, such as
images, or simple sensations.
Noncognitive emotion elicitation in computational models.
There is a longstanding and still ongoing discussion in
psychology about the importance, and even existence, of
“noncognitive” emotion generation (e.g., [91], [93], [189],
[209]). This discussion has suffered, among other things,
7. Closer investigation of the issue suggests, however, that there are at
least tensions between the assumptions of different emotion theories about
the causes, nature and effects of emotions. For example, it can be argued
that, at closer look, a cognitive view of emotion elicitation does not fit
comfortably with a discrete emotions perspective [148].
8. Alternative terms used for “desire” in the emotion literature are
“motive” (e.g., [92]), “goal” (e.g., [129], [166]) and “concern” (e.g., [62]).
Although all of these terms are meant to denote similar motivational
representations, there are some differences between theorists about how,
exactly, they are conceptualized. Here, we understand desires as motiva-
tional representations with propositional contents, i.e., as motivational
representations of states of affairs [70], [171]. Desires include both
performative desires (desires to do something) and nonperformative desires
(desires that something should be the case) [195].
from the failure to distinguish clearly between the two
described version of the hypothesis of noncognitive
emotion elicitation. Hypothesis (a), which claims that
certain kinds of affect (such as sensory pleasures and
displeasures) are noncognitively generated in the described
sense—i.e., presuppose only nonpropositional or even just
nonconceptual representations—is intuitively plausible
[148]. In contrast, Hypothesis (b), according to which even
prototypical emotions such as fear, anger, or joy can be (and
perhaps even, often are) noncognitively caused (e.g., that
fear can be elicited by the visual appearance of an abyss or
by loud sounds, without any mediating thoughts), is more
controversial. On closer inspection, the data that have been
adduced to support this hypothesis turn out to be less
convincing than is often claimed (see, e.g., [151], [175],
[173]). For example, it has been argued that noncognitive
emotion generation is demonstrated by the finding that
certain emotional stimuli elicit physiological reactions even
if they are presented below the threshold of awareness (e.g.,
[128]; see [189] for a review). However, recent studies point
to the possibility that the observed physiological reactions
were shown by a subset of the participants who were still
able to recognize the emotional stimuli at the presumed
“subliminal” exposure durations (see, e.g., [132]). Further-
more, even if it is a genuine phenomenon, emotion
elicitation by subliminal stimuli could be mediated by
automatized and unconscious cognitive appraisal processes
(e.g., [174], [181]).
It should be noted, however, that regardless of how this
issue is decided, the computational modeling of “reactive”
emotion elicitation by specific objects or patterns of sensory
stimulation is a comparatively easy task (e.g., [3], [53]). The
real computational challenge is posed by the cognitively
mediated emotions [68].
Cognitive emotion elicitation: two theories. Philosophers of
emotion (e.g., [70]) have drawn a distinction between two
basic kinds of cognitive emotion theories: cognitive-evaluative
(or evaluative-beliefs) theories, and cognitive-motivational (or
belief-desire) theories. The crucial difference between the
two concerns the proximatemental causes (or, depending on
viewpoint, the constituents; [154], [153]) of emotions: Are
they only beliefs (including evaluative beliefs); or are they
beliefs and desires? To illustrate the difference with a simple
example, according to the cognitive-evaluative theory
(which arguably comprises most psychological appraisal
theories), John is happy about a state of affairs p if he believes
that p is the case and believes that p is good for him (e.g., [9]).
In contrast, according to the belief-desire theory, John is
happy about p if he believes p and desires p (e.g., [37], [70],
[126], [151]). Hence, according to the belief-desire theory, the
evaluative beliefs (appraisals) featured in the cognitive-
evaluative theory of emotion are in fact not required for
emotions; all that is needed are factual beliefs and desires.
The distinction between the two theories rests on the
assumption, which is widely shared in contemporary
philosophy, that beliefs and desires are fundamentally
distinct kinds of mental states that cannot be reduced to one
another (e.g., [70], [171]). Beliefs are informational mental
states: their function is to provide the agent with informa-
tion about the world and the self. By contrast, desires are
motivational states: their function is to provide the agent
with goals, states of affairs whose realization is attempted
under suitable circumstances (e.g., [70]; see also [143]).
Proponents of the belief-desire theory of emotion have
argued that this theory avoids a number of objections to the
cognitive-evaluative theory (see [70], [151]), including the
objection that evaluative beliefs are, as a matter of fact,
neither necessary nor sufficient for emotions. A discussion
of these arguments, which would require an in-depth
comparison of the foundational assumptions of the two
kinds of cognitive emotion theory, is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, we would like to point out that it is
possible to a large degree to “map” the assumptions of each
theory into the conceptual framework provided by the other
(although with a corresponding shift in meaning!). This
remapping is possible because most appraisal theories
assume that appraisals (evaluations of perceived events as
good or bad) result from the comparison of perceived or
believed events with goals [148]. Psychological appraisal
theory can, therefore, be regarded as a special version of the
belief-desire theory of emotion which assumes that the
causal link between beliefs and desires on the one hand
(e.g., the belief that p and the desire for p), and emotions on
the other hand (e.g., the emotion of joy about p) is mediated
by the appraisal of p [148]. Conversely, the belief-desire
theory can be recovered from appraisal theory by linking
belief and desire directly to the emotion. This can be
achieved by either dropping the mediating appraisal from
the theory, or by reinterpreting the appraisal (the outcome of
the comparisons of perceived events with goals) as being the
emotion (e.g., as a preverbal form of evaluation that is
experienced as a feeling of pleasure or displeasure; see
[151]). Several recent formalizations of appraisal theories
have in fact implicitly used this approach and thus have
effectively reinterpreted appraisal theory as belief-desire
theory (e.g., [1], [187]; see Section 3.2). Analogously, some
computational models of emotion (e.g., [20]) treat emotions
as direct effects of goals and beliefs, without a separate,
mediating appraisal state (see Section 4.2).
2.2.4 Classifying Hypotheses about Emotion Effects
Compared to the broad consensus about how emotions are
elicited, there is considerably less agreement in the psycho-
logical (and philosophical) literature about how, exactly,
emotions influence subsequent cognitive processes and
behavior. Many different hypotheses about the effects of
emotions have beenproposed (see, e.g., [80] for an overview).
To get a systematic grip on them, it is useful to distinguish,
first, between functional and nonfunctional effects of emotions.
The concept “functional” in this distinction is best explicated
in evolutionary terms (e.g., [117]): Functional effects of
emotions are those of their effects that were responsible for
the selection of the corresponding emotion mechanisms in
evolution, whereas nonfunctional effects of emotions are
neutral, or evennegative effects of emotions that are tolerated
to reap the benefits of emotions (see also [120]).9 To illustrate,
one proposed functional effect of emotions is the focusing of
attention on the emotion-evoking events (see below). A
nonfunctional and potentially even harmful side effect of this
is a reduced capacity for engaging in other, simultaneous
9. The assumption that emotions are overall adaptive is widely accepted
in today’s psychology. The best general argument for this assumption is
that it is hard to see how complex mechanisms like emotions could have
emerged in evolution other than by natural selection, and hence because of
their useful effects (see [49]).
tasks. Ideally, only functional effects of emotionswould have
to be explicitly considered in computational emotion models,
because nonfunctional effects would arise naturally as side
effects of the activity of the mechanisms that produce the
functional effects (e.g., [160]).
Although many specific functions of emotions have been
proposed (e.g., [63], [70], [85]), it appears that most of them
can be classified into one of three categories (e.g., [130]):10
1. Informational or epistemic functions of emotions. Ac-
cording to this hypothesis, a main function of
emotions is to provide adaptively useful information
to other cognitive (sub-)systems, including other
agents (via nonverbal or verbal communication). The
information in question is held to be in particular
information about a) the occurrence of appraisals
(e.g., [170]) or of changes in the person’s belief-desire
system [151], [157] and b) related to this, information
about the value of objects and events, including
action consequences (e.g., [43], [111], [180]).
2. Attentional or resource-allocation functions of emotions.
According to this hypothesis, emotions serve to shift
the focus of attention to (or computationally speak-
ing, allocate central processing resources to) their
eliciting events, or to give priority to them in
processing (e.g., [176], [151], [178]).
3. Motivational functions of emotions. This hypothesis
claims that a main adaptive function of emotion is to
reprioritize existing or to generate new goals or
intentions (e.g., [62], [127]). With respect to the
generation of new goals by emotions, the two main
proposals are a) emotions create hedonistic desires
(desires to reduce or avoid negative, or to maintain
or produce positive feelings; e.g., [18], [113]);
b) emotions induce emotion-specific goals or action
tendencies (e.g., fear causes the desire to flee, anger
to aggress, pity to help) directly, that is, without the
mediation of hedonistic desires (e.g., [62], [109],
[161], [203]). A possible mediating mechanism for
the latter effect could be that emotions draw
attention to, or increase the salience or persistence
of goals currently at stake (e.g., [3], [77], [118]; see
also [145]). Hence, the motivational effects of
emotions could be partly based on their attentional
and informational effects [151].
2.2.5 A Note on the Relation between Emotion and
Motivation
We end this part with a few comments on the relation
between the psychology of emotion and motivation
(including decision making).11 Although there is general
agreement that emotion and motivation are related and
several early theorists have strongly emphasized their
connection (e.g., [22], [109]), during the 20th century the
fields of motivation and emotion psychology have to a large
degree developed independently. As a consequence, some
of the best-known psychological theories of motivation and
decision making, such as the theory of planned behavior [2]
or prospect theory [84], do not consider emotions, at least
not explicitly. Although it can be argued that even in these
formally affect-free theories, emotions are implicitly con-
sidered as a possible source of utility (i.e., as hedonistic
desires, as explained in Section 2.2.4; see [10], [42]), the
explicit recognition of emotions as separate variables in
modern motivation and decision theories is of relatively
recent origin (e.g., [113], [180], [203]). Likewise, 20th century
emotion theorists have typically paid little attention to
theories of motivation and decision making. That is, in
developing their theories of the generation and nature, and
even the effects of emotions, these emotion theorists have
typically not tried to explain (at least not in detail) how
emotions fit into the mechanisms of goal and action
selection described by existing theories of motivation [145].
To further clarify the relation between emotion and
motivation, we briefly consider the question from the
perspective of motivation theory. It can be argued that
nearly all current theories of motivation and action genera-
tion are variants of a singly basic theory, the belief-desire
theory of action (for a selective sample of the relevant
literature, see [29], [41], [59], [60], [66], [112], [172], [183],
[202], [206]). The basic assumption of the belief-desire
theory of action is that actions—or more precisely, inten-
tions to act, which then cause actions under favorable
circumstances—are products of beliefs about one’s current
state and means-ends relations, and desires for the ends.12
Philosophical proponents of the theory have argued that to
produce adaptive actions, exactly these two kinds of
representational states, the one informational and the other
motivational, are needed (e.g., [183]): Without beliefs (about
the current state of the world and about ways to achieve
goals), desires would be blind; without desires, beliefs
would be inert. These considerations suggest that—contrary
to the claims of some emotion theorists (e.g., [22] and
possibly [43])—emotions are not indispensable for the gen-
eration of adaptive actions; even though affect-free actions
may well be overall less adaptive than actions that are also
informed by emotions (see Section 2.2.4). Support for this
conclusion might be seen in the fact that it is possible to
develop workable theories of motivation and decision
making without explicitly considering emotions (e.g., [2],10. It has also been proposed that the main evolutionary function of
emotions is to coordinate the subsystems of the organism into an adaptive
whole-organism response to evolutionarily significant challenges and
opportunities (e.g., [110], [127], [166], [196]). However, the available
empirical evidence suggests that the components of emotional syndromes
are in fact only loosely associated (e.g., [17]) and the observed clustering can
probably be explained as the result of the three described functional effects.
Other documented effects of (some) emotions comprise the priming of
emotion-congruent material in memory and the biasing of information
processing in emotion-congruent ways (e.g., [7], [23], [170]); as well as
physiological activation. Whereas physiological activation can be given a
reasonably plausible functional explanation (it served to prepare fight/
flight reactions in evolutionary predicaments; [35], [166]), the functionality
of the biasing effects of emotion on memory and information processing is
debated (for one possible functional explanation, see [158]).
11. According to Weiner [202], motivation psychology is concerned with
explaining why humans behave as they do. If one accepts that human
behaviors are for the most part goal-directed, this means that motivation
psychology is centrally concerned with explicating the processes that
generate goal-directed behavior [42]. Thus, a theory of motivation is
essentially a theory of the mechanisms of action and goal generation,
including a theory of basic goals or fundamental desires.
12. Decision theories (including subjective expected utility theory,
prospect theory, and diverse psychological expectancy-value theories such
as the theory of planned behavior) can be regarded as different attempts to
quantify a generalized version of the belief-desire theory of action [145].
However, the relation between specific versions of belief-desire theory, such
as BDI theory, and decision theory is not straightforward (e.g., [47]).
[84]). Support might also be seen in the fact that it has been
possible to create artificial agents that show reasonably
adaptive goal-directed behavior even though their actions
are not explicitly influenced by internal states correspond-
ing to emotions (e.g., BDI agents; [142]; see Section 4.2).13
By contrast, the generation of intentional actions is simply
unthinkable without motivational mechanisms—mechan-
isms of goal selection and action generation that invoke
desires and beliefs (see also, [199]). In line with this, it
appears that to the degree that the effects of emotions on
intentional action have been discussed in some detail by
emotion theorists, they presuppose for the most part, at least
implicitly, a traditional motivation or decision theory (e.g.,
[9], [43], [62], [92]).
Perhaps these considerations may be taken to suggest the
following: First, the central evolutionary function of emo-
tions is to improve the generation of adaptive action beyond
what is possible with beliefs and desires alone. Second,
emotions achieve this by influencing, in one way or other,
the motivational (belief-desire) machinery that proximately
controls actions. This may be what unites the above-
described informational, attentional and motivational ef-
fects of emotions.
2.2.6 Formal Tools for Representing Emotion Theories
Although informal analyses of emotion theories can go a
long way toward clarifying and systematizing them, even
the reconstructed theories will usually not be sufficiently
precise and complete to be directly implemented as
computational models. Of course, increasing the precision
and completeness of a theory is precisely one goal of
creating a computational model of that theory (e.g., [61],
[192]). However, at this point in the history of computa-
tional modeling, the direct implementation of an emotion
theory as a computer program is usually not the best way
to go—at least if this means to program everything from
scratch. For one reason, this is a cumbersome way to
proceed, as it requires to invent or at least program much
anew; for another reason, too many potentially irrelevant
implementation choices have to be made along the way.
In this and the following section, we consider two
alternatives: 1) Formalizing emotion theories in a precise
but implementation-independent formal language; and
2) implementing emotion theories in a (comparatively)
general-purpose cognitive or agent architecture.
3 THEORY FORMALIZATIONS: SET THEORY AND
AGENT LOGICS
The first proposal consists of translating a psychological
emotion theory (or selected assumptions of one or more
emotion theories, as discussed in Section 2.2), as an
intermediate step, into a precise, but implementation-
independent language. Such a formalization has two main
benefits (e.g., [74]). The first coincides with the general
benefit of theory formalization. This benefit derives to a
large extent from the fact that the formalization of a theory
is usually much more than a simple translation of the theory
into a formal language; it is simultaneously a process of
explicating the theory: resolving ambiguities and possible
inconsistencies, uncovering hidden assumptions, adding
missing assumptions, and the like (e.g., [205]). The result,
ideally, is an improved version of the original theory: a
version that is precise, consistent, complete, and concise. In
addition, formalizations provide improved opportunities
for comparing and evaluating the assumptions of different
theories described in the same format, they facilitate the
derivation of predictions, and they can raise new questions
that may even suggest additional empirical research.
However, it can be argued that the general benefits of
formalization are shared by computational models (which
can be regarded as formalizations of substantive theories in
a programming language; e.g., [108]).14 What are the special
benefits of first creating a formal specification of a
psychological emotion theory, that is then implemented as
a computational model? Perhaps the main benefit is that
such a formalization yields a precise model of the
psychological theory but avoids a commitment to poten-
tially irrelevant implementation details (that are a necessary
part of a computational model). That is, only assumptions
regarded as essential for the emotion theory in question
need to be considered in the formalization, whereas
computational details—even important ones such as the
structure of the agent architecture—can be ignored if they
are considered irrelevant [74]. As a consequence, less effort
is needed to verify that a formal model is a correct
representation of an emotion theory, than would be
required to verify a computational model. In addition, a
precise and unambiguous formal version of an emotion
theory facilitates its subsequent implementation as a
computational model (see also, [45]). Finally, like the source
theories on which they are based, formalized theories still
allow to deduce implications (make predictions) directly,
whereas computational models need to be run to generate
predictions. Because of their special virtues, theory for-
malizations in implementation-independent languages can
also be useful for comparing existing computational models
of emotions.
3.1 Set-Theoretical Formalization of Emotion
Theories
Broekens et al. [32] propose to use set theory as a language for
formalizing psychological emotion theories (see also, [147]).
Set theory recommends itself as a formalism for the precise
reconstruction of theories because of its expressiveness; in
particular, (nearly) all mathematical concepts can be defined
in terms of set-theoretical concepts [Bourbaki, 28].15 Choos-
ing set theory as the formalization language therefore makes
all of classical mathematics available for theory reconstruc-
tion and essentially amounts to the mathematization of a
13. As mentioned, the belief-desire theory of action and its quantitative
version, decision theory, do not exclude an influence of emotions (in the
form of hedonistic desires). Our argument here is that these theories do not
require emotions; in particular, nothing in these theories enforces a
hedonistic interpretation of desires. Actions require desires for goals, but
as already stressed by McDougall [109], the goals need not be hedonistic.
14. More precisely, one should say that certain parts of computational
models (those corresponding to the theory) algorithmically implement, or
realize, substantive theories (e.g., [102]).
15. Note that the Bourbaki approach uses informal rather than formal (in
the sense of axiomatic) set theory; hence, this approach can be described as
“informal formalization” [184].
theory (by which we understand the construction of a
mathematical, although not necessarily a quantitative mod-
el). A set-theoretical formalism is alsowell suited to represent
computational theories (as well as psychological theories
interpreted as information-processing theories), because a
common way of describing computational processes is as
mathematical functions that map input to output informa-
tion. This formal representation translates fairly directly into
familiar graphical descriptions of systems, such as the block
diagrams used in cybernetics and computer science and
associatedmethods such as functional decomposition, and is
also closely related to causal modeling formalisms used in
psychology (e.g., [26]). These parallels can be exploited to
depict computational functions in a more accessible graphi-
cal format (e.g., [32]) and conversely, to translate graphical
theory proposals into set-theoretical language.
For example, Broekens et al. [32] break up the emotion
generation process assumed by cognitive appraisal theories
into three linked functions (see Fig. 1): Perceptual processes
map external objects into percepts (or mental objects);
appraisal processes map mental objects into different apprai-
sal dimension values; and mediating processes map apprai-
sals into components of emotional reactions (e.g., feelings,
expressions, actions). Using this basic functional (or
process) decomposition, Broekens et al. then propose set-
theoretical formalizations of two specific appraisal theories,
Scherer’s [166] stimulus evaluation check theory, and Smith
and Kirby’s [181] appraisal detector theory.
The set-theoretical formalization of emotion theories
used by Broekens et al. [32] ties in naturally with a still
more rigorous set-theoretical formalism for theory recon-
struction, developed as part of the so-called structuralist
program in the philosophy of science (e.g., [14], [15], [204]).
Essentially, this formalism consists of set theory (including
whatever parts of mathematics are needed) enriched with a
set of precisely defined special concepts that describe
common, recurring components of empirical theories.
According to structuralism, empirical theories are best
viewed, from the systematic perspective, as set-theoretic
structures composed of so-called theory-elements. At mini-
mum, a structuralist reconstruction of a theory consists of a
single theory element, but frequently it consist of several
hierarchically connected theory-elements, called theory-nets.
In the typical case, theory-nets comprise a basic element
that represents the fundamental assumptions of a theory,
plus a number of specialized elements that result from the
basic element through the more precise specification of
existing or the addition of further assumptions. In this way,
theory nets allow to represent both refinements and
different elaborations of a common core idea. In addition,
theory elements belonging to different theory nets can be
connected through intertheoretical links. Links are used to
formally express the fact that empirical theories typically
presuppose other theories (e.g., theories of measurement of
their basic quantities). The basic building blocks of theories,
the theory elements, have a precisely defined internal
structure: They are defined as tuples <KðTÞ; IðTÞ>, where
K(T) is the mathematical core of the theory, and I(T) is a
set of intended applications of the theory core. K(T)
consists in particular (but not exclusively) of the classes
of potential models (Mp) and the class of models (M) of the
theory. Potential models are all entities (set-theoretical
structures, or systems) that can be described in terms of the
theory’s basic concepts, and for which it is therefore
meaningful to ask whether they fulfill the substantive laws
of the theory; whereas models are potential models that
also fulfill these laws.
To use an elementary example, consider a structuralist
reconstruction of a miniature quantitative belief-desire
theory of hope and fear (e.g., [151]). The class of potential
models of the basic element of this theory could be defined
as the set of systems x ¼ <PROP, TIMES, b, d, hope, fear>
consisting of a set of propositions PROP ¼ fp1; p2; . . . ; png, a
set of time points TIMES ¼ ft1; t2; . . . ; tmg, a belief function
b: PROP  TIMES ! [0, 1], a desire function d: PROP 
TIMES ! IR (the set of real numbers), and functions for
hope and fear, both of which are also defined on PROP 
TIMES! IR. A system x belongs to the class of models of
this mini-theory of hope and fear if x is a potential model of
the theory and in addition fulfils the following two laws
(which are possible specializations of the more general
functions proposed in [151]; see also, [95]):
hopeðp; tÞ ¼ bðp; tÞ  dðp; tÞ if 0 < bðp; tÞ
< 1 and dðp; tÞ > 0; else 0;
fearðp; tÞ ¼ jbðp; tÞ  dðp; tÞj if 0 < bðp; tÞ
< 1 and dðp; tÞ < 0; else 0:
Because the definitions of set-theoretic predicates never
yield a sufficient characterization of an empirical theory, the
theory’s range of application is determined by describing
a set of intended applications I(T). This is done by
1) explicitly listing a few real systems, called paradigms,
and declaring them to be intended systems, or applications
of the theory core; and by 2) declaring all other systems to
be intended applications if they are sufficiently similar to
the paradigmatic cases. For example, one paradigmatic
application of hope-fear theory would be the experiences of
hope and fear of a person awaiting a possible gain (hope) or
loss (fear) in a two-outcome lottery where the other
outcome is zero [156]; whereas another intended applica-
tion might be the hope and fear experiences of gamers at
certain stages in a computer game [69].
The viability of the structuralist approach to theory
reconstruction is documented by the fact that at least
50 reconstructions of different theories from diverse dis-
ciplines have been published (see, e.g., [15], [204]), including
several theories from psychology. Westmeyer [205], there-
fore, recommended the structuralist approach as a general
methodology for theoretical psychology; while Balzer and
Moulines [13] recommended the structuralist formalism of
theory representation (specifically to computer scientists) as
Fig. 1. Basic framework for a set-theoretical formalization of appraisal
theories [32].
a good tool for representing scientific knowledge in a
general context.16 Furthermore, the structuralist view of
theories has inspired a simulation language for social
science applications (MIMOSE; now obsolete) that facilitates
the transformation of a structuralist theory reconstruction
into an executable program ([197]; see [198] for other
simulation languages that show a similar correspondence
to set-theoretic formalizations17). Although so far only one
serious structuralist reconstruction of an emotion theory (the
3D theory of emotion proposed by Wundt [207]) seems to
have been attempted [146], the sketch of the belief-desire
model of hope and fear given above and the set-theoretic
formalizations of the two emotion theories proposed by
Broekens et al. [32] suggest that rigorous structuralist
reconstructions of other emotion theories are certainly
feasible. Importantly, as mentioned above, structuralist
reconstructions of psychological theories are not restricted
to intentional-level theories [51], but extend to design-level
(computational) theories. Hence, the structuralist idiom
could also be used for an abstract description of computa-
tional emotion models realized in cognitive and agent
architectures such as Soar (e.g., [68], [104]; Section 4.1), the
belief-desire-intention (BDI) architecture (e.g., [20]; Sec-
tion 4.2), or affective agent architectures (e.g., [77]; Sec-
tion 4.3). In fact, a structuralist reconstruction of a precursor
of ACT-R (ACT*, [4]) has been presented by Heise [72].
3.2 Formalizing Emotion Theories in Agent Logics
Even though Balzer and Moulines [13] recommended the
set-theoretic formalization of theories for representing
scientific knowledge in a general context, they acknowl-
edged that more restrictive formalisms may be more useful
for specific applications. In particular, applied computer
scientists who seek to develop a computational model of
an emotion theory may prefer a formal specification
language that, while less expressive than set theory,
provides them with more structure, to facilitate the
transformation from specification to implementation. One
particularly interesting alternative possibility of formaliz-
ing emotion theories—at least intentional-level, cognitive
emotion theories (see Section 2.2.3)—is to represent them in
a logic language. During the last 20 years, several logic
languages have been developed for modeling cognitive
autonomous agents that are suited for this purpose. Most
of these so-called agent logics belong to the class of (broadly
conceived) belief-desire-intention logics, that describe auton-
omous agents on the intentional level [51] in terms of
beliefs, desires (goals), intentions (roughly, the goals that
the agent has committed to) and possibly other related
attitudes, such as capabilities (see, e.g., [54], [199], [206]).
More precisely, BDI logics are formal logic languages
that arise from the combination of several modal logics: a
temporal or a dynamic logic used to capture the dynamic
nature of agents, and logics for the mental states of belief,
desire and intention. Each of the modal operators is given a
precise syntactical definition in terms of a set of axioms,
and a precise semantics in terms of possible worlds models
(Kripke structures; see, for example, [81]). The axioms for
belief, desire and intention and their interaction encapsu-
late principles of thinking (belief-formation) and deciding
for an idealized rational agent that reasons qualitatively
[206]. Put differently, these axioms encapsulate a qualitative
version of rational decision theory [47], whose basic
decision principle is simply that rational agents intend to
do what they believe will lead to what they desire [21],
[138]. To this, BDI theory adds the important idea that
rational decision makers need to show some commitment
to their intentions [29].
As mentioned in Section 2.2.3, most (at least most
“higher”) emotions are thought to depend on beliefs
and—directly or indirectly—on desires. Therefore, BDI
logics are natural candidates for formalizing theories of
(these) emotions. A second reason for formalizing emotion
theories in BDI logics is that these logics already contain
axioms for decision making and hence describe a work-
able, autonomous goal-directed agent. Formalizing an
emotion theory in a BDI logic thus amounts to introducing
emotion concepts into a formal theory of rational agency,
or a formal qualitative decision theory. This approach
facilitates the modeling of the effects of emotion on action
(e.g., [46]) and the systematic investigation of the benefits
of emotion mechanisms for goal-directed rational agents
(e.g., [45], [97], [99]).
Although semiformal belief-desire analyses of some
emotions have been proposed by philosophers at least
since the 1970s (e.g., [48], [50], [70], [171]), rigorous
formalizations of belief-desire analyses of emotions in
agent logics are of relatively recent origin. Most of these
formalizations focus on the cognitive and motivational
preconditions (or, depending on viewpoint, the compo-
nents; see [70]) of emotions (e.g., [1], [36], [114], [133], [186],
[187]). For example, Castelfranchi and Lorini ([36]; see [96]
for an update) formalized the belief-desire preconditions of
a set of emotions related to expectations (hope, fear,
disappointment, and relief) using one of the first BDI
logics, proposed by Cohen and Levesque [40]. Meyer [114]
used KARO, an agent logic based on a dynamic logic
augmented with BDI-type modal operators [200] to for-
malize the belief-desire preconditions of four basic emo-
tions (happiness, sadness, anger, and fear) proposed in
Oatley and Johnson-Laird’s [127] theory of emotion,
another belief-desire theory (see also [126]). More recently,
Steunebrink et al. [187] used KARO to formalize the
cognitive-motivational preconditions of the 22 emotions
considered in the OCC theory [129]. Another formalization
of the OCC theory, using an extended version of the
Cohen-Levesque logic, was proposed by Adam et al. [1]. As
mentioned in Section 2.2.3, these formalizations involve a
reinterpretation of the OCC theory as a belief-desire theory
of emotion.
In addition to formalizing hypotheses about emotion
generation, recent work has formalized some of the
proposed effects of emotion (see Section 2.2.4), specifically
their effects of actions [187], [46], including expressive
speech acts [71].
The main motivation behind these logic formalizations of
emotion theories has been to provide rigorous formal
16. According to the authors, “there seems to be a fact of the matter that
requires a set-theoretic representation of scientific knowledge, all weaker
(and logically nicer) formal systems [being] too poor in expressive power or
otherwise too restrictive for the working scientist” ([13, p. 9]).
17. Thanks are due to Klaus Troitzsch for providing this information.
specifications for the implementation of emotions in
autonomous agents. However, as mentioned, these forma-
lizations can also be useful for psychologists and philoso-
phers of emotion: Apart from providing a concise summary
of a psychological or philosophical source theory, they can
help to clarify and disambiguate assumptions of the source
theory, reveal problematic implications that may otherwise
remain hidden or go unnoticed, facilitate the derivation of
consequences, and raise new questions [1].18 Several
examples can be cited to support these claims:
1. Steunebrink et al. [186] as well as Adam et al. [1]
found that their logical reconstructions of the OCC
theory revealed a number of ambiguities in that
theory, such as whether event-based emotions are
caused by perceived events or the believed con-
sequences of events.
2. Adam et al.’s [1] reconstruction of the OCC theory
led them to propose, for example, that an agent is
disappointed about a state of affairs not-p if it
believes not-p to be the case, desired p to occur, and
believes that he previously expected p. Hence, agents
need to form a metacognition (a belief about an own
belief) to experience disappointment. Although this
requirement may be unproblematic for artificial
agents, at least in principle (though not for some
concrete realizations of BDI agents; for example,
[73]), it could be problematic for humans [151].
Adam et al.’s formalization makes this assumption
transparent and thereby presents it for discussion. In
fact, Castelfranchi and Lorini [36] and Steunebrink
et al. [187] have proposed alternative analyses of
disappointment that avoid postulating metacogni-
tions. For example, Castelfranchi and Lorini assume
that an agent is disappointed about not-p if it
previously hoped that p will occur and then comes
to believe not-p (see also [151]).
3. The two formalizations of the OCC theory by Adam
et al. [1] and Steunebrink et al. [187] also differ in
several other respects (see [187] for a discussion)
that could stimulate discussion and possibly even
empirical research.
4. The logical formalizations bring into sharp focus
the question of the nature of emotions in belief-
desire theory. In the majority of the existing
formalizations (the exception is [187]), emotions
are defined in terms of beliefs and desires—for
example, joyðpÞ ¼df belðpÞ & des(p)—which might
suggest that emotions are to be equated with
particular belief-desire structures. This has indeed
been proposed by some belief-desire theorists of
emotion (e.g., [105]; see also [70]). However, this is
neither the only nor necessarily the most plausible
version of the belief-desire theory of emotion (see
[153] for a detailed discussion). In fact, most
authors make clear that they do not intend their
formalizations as implying a reduction of emotions
to beliefs and desires, or at least do not wish to
commit to this theory of the nature of emotion.
Rather, the formalization is meant to express, or at
least to be also compatible with, the idea that
beliefs and desires are necessary, and under normal
circumstances also sufficient, causes of emotions.
Let us now consider two possible, general objections to
formalizations of emotion theories in BDI logics. The first is
that BDI logics are not expressive enough to accommodate all
assumptions of psychological emotion theories. Three
concrete forms of this objection are the following: 1) The
above-mentioned formalizations are purely qualitative;
however, emotions differ not only in quality but also in
intensity, and intensity is important for explaining certain
effects of emotions [64]. To account for emotion intensity,
quantitative concepts of belief and desire are needed.
2) Even on the qualitative level, BDI logics may not be rich
enough to formalize the cognitive-motivational precondi-
tions of all emotions. For example, it has been argued that
feeling guilty about p presupposes not only the belief that p
is the case and the desire that p should not have occurred,
but also the belief that one is responsible for p (e.g., [129],
[203]). 3) Although BDI logics go beyond traditional
“static” decision and action theories in considering the
dynamics of mental states and actions, they are still
restricted to the intentional level of system analysis [51];
they do not address the underlying representations and
computational processes.
These objections can be answered as follows: As to the
first objection (BDI emotion models are qualitative), it can
be argued that for one thing, precise qualitative formula-
tions are no less important than quantitative ones (e.g.,
[129]). For another thing, it is possible to extend BDI logics
to account for emotion intensity. For example, Lorini [96],
[46] proposed to combine a dynamic logic of knowledge
with a logic for graded beliefs and desires for this purpose.
Similarly, Steunebrink et al. [185] have incorporated
quantitative aspects of emotion into their KARO model.
The second objection can be answered similarly. For
example, to explicate the concept of responsibility and
related concepts such as preventing and causing, Lorini and
Schwarzentruber [98] have proposed to combine BDI logic
with STIT logic (a logic of “seeing to it that”).
As to the third objection (logical emotion models are
restricted to the intentional level of system analysis), this
restriction is deliberate and does not preclude combining
the logical models with design-level assumptions, as are in
fact provided by BDI architectures (see Section 4.2). On the
contrary, as mentioned, because of their greater precision,
logical BDI models can assist the creation of computational
models. Nevertheless, at this juncture, the interests of
psychologists and computer scientists may partly diverge.
From the perspective of computer scientists, at least those
pursuing applied goals, a specification of an emotion theory
that abstracts completely from questions concerning repre-
sentational formats and computational mechanisms may be
regarded as a benefit. In contrast, as mentioned in Section 2,
psychologists adhering to the computational paradigm are
18. The fact that a variety of different BDI-type logics are available to
choose from should probably be regarded as an asset rather than as a
disadvantage. First, it means that one need not commit to a particular logic;
different routes can be tried and compared. Second, the existence of
different logics suggests that basic conceptual issues need to be, and can be,
explored while formalizing emotion theories.
equally interested in certain design-level questions,
although not in all (e.g., [68]; see also [151], [178]).
A second general objection that could be raised against
formalizing emotion theories in BDI logics is that the
rationality assumptions incorporated in the usual axioms
for belief, desire and intention imply that the logical BDI
models can only be regarded as strong idealizations of
human belief-formation and decision making. For example,
standard BDI logics assume that agents believe and desire
all logical implications of their beliefs and desires, respec-
tively, and are also perfectly aware of the beliefs and desires
that they have (e.g., [58]). These are not plausible assump-
tions to make for real agents with limited memory, limited
processing time and (most likely) limited metacognitive
abilities. Because these rationality assumptions carry over to
beliefs and desires as presuppositions of emotion, the
logical models of “emotion-enhanced” BDI agents can
likewise be regarded only as strong idealizations of human
emotion mechanisms.
To some degree, this criticism can be met by formulating
at least the emotion axioms in ways that do not demand
more from agents than is necessary and psychologically
plausible (see [36], [187]). Beyond that, attempts have been
made to develop logics that describe “less than ideal”
agents (e.g., resource-bounded epistemic logics, [115]).
However, this project has its own problems; for example,
Duc [56] argues that by axiomatically restricting the
rationality of agents, nothing is left that can account for
their rationality any more. From the perspective of
psychology, two additional considerations may be more
important: First, it should be remembered that all theories
are idealizations and that even strong idealizations can be
quite useful (consider, for example, the case of game theory;
e.g., [34]). In particular, the strong rationality assumptions
of BDI logic can be mentally set aside when the logic is used
as a tool to clarify hypotheses (see [41]); for this purpose,
what mainly counts is the increased precision provided by
the formal language. Second, computer implementations of
BDI agents (as opposed to their logical descriptions) have to
operate under time and memory constraints like humans.
As a consequence, they become boundedly rational agents,
rational agents that behave as well as possible given their
limited resources and their constraints (e.g., [169]). To
obtain more realistic models of motivational and emotional
processes, psychologists can, therefore, focus on the BDI
architectures (see Section 4.2).
4 MODELING EMOTIONs USING COGNITIVE AND
AGENT ARCHITECTURES
Another proposal for bridging the gap between psycholo-
gical emotion theories and computational emotion model-
ing, as well as for increasing the comparability of different
computational emotion models, is to encourage the use of
(suitably extended) general-purpose cognitive and agent
architectures to model emotion theories. Cognitive architec-
tures and agent architectures are theories of the basic design-
level structure [51] of cognitive systems or agents, respec-
tively: theories that describe their domain-independent,
basic computational structures (e.g., memories, representa-
tional systems) and processes (e.g., a repeated sense-think/
decide-act cycle) (e.g., [6], [88], [164], [192]). From the
perspective of the user (modeler), an architecture appears as
the “hardwired” part of an agent that cannot be changed
(at least not easily).
Architectures are typically used to facilitate the creation of
computational models of specific psychological phenomena
of interest, such as the performance on a particular task (e.g.,
in the case of emotion research, the performance on the Iowa
gambling task; [188]). The main advantage of using an
architecture for this purpose, compared to creating a
computational model from scratch, is that the architecture
takes care of numerous implementation choices that other-
wisewould have to bemade. Thereby, it relieves themodeler
of the need to invent everything anew and helps—similar to
the formal languages discussed in Section 3, but in a different
way—to solve the problem of irrelevant design specifica-
tions: Whereas in the formal models, design assumptions
considered irrelevant are omitted, in an architecture, they are
assigned plausible default values. By letting the architecture
take care of design decisions, the modeler implicitly accepts
that the respective assumptions of the architecture are
correct, or at least not too far off the mark in ways that
matter to the phenomenon of interest. If one is willing to
make this assumption, the use of an architecture can greatly
simplify the creation of a computational emotion model
[108]. Furthermore, to the degree that architectures are
becoming reasonably easy to use even for nonprofessional
programmers, they could significantly lower the threshold
for more psychologists becoming interested in, and even
engaging themselves in the computational modeling of
emotions. In addition, the research efforts of affective
computing scientists could be focused, and competing
proposals more easily compared, by modeling emotions in
otherwise well-understood architectures.
However, the role of architectures in computational
modeling extends beyond these practical benefits: Archi-
tectures can also play important theoretical roles. In
particular, to the degree that an architecture is well-
anchored in theory and research and hence contains many
at least approximately correct psychological assumptions,
the computational distinctions incorporated in the archi-
tecture (e.g., between deliberative and automatic proces-
sing) can be exploited to clarify similar distinctions
proposed in a psychological process theory of emotion
(see, e.g., [68], and Section 4.1). Sloman [178] even argues
that an understanding of emotions can only be attained by
considering the role of emotions in cognitive architectures.
As Sloman puts it: “A proper analysis of the concept of an
“affective” state or process must be based on a more general
theory of the coarse-grained architecture of mind” ([178,
p. 233]). This said, it should be acknowledged that the fixed
computational structure provided by a given architecture
can also be a disadvantage: namely, if it constrains what one
wants to model in crucial respects. This consideration is
particularly important in the computational modeling of
emotion, because emotions may be implicated in basic
psychological processes at the architectural level (see
Section 2.2.4; see also [151]).
General overviews of cognitive and agent architectures
are provided by Chong et al. [38], Langley et al. [90], Vernon
et al. [201], and Zacharias et al. [208]; for overviews of
emotional agent architectures, see Hudlicka [78] and
Marsella et al. [108]. For the purpose of our review, we
have grouped the (comparatively) general-purpose cogni-
tive and agent architectures that can be and in fact have
been used for emotion modeling into 1) by now “classical”
cognitive architectures such as Soar or ACT-R (see Sec-
tion 4.1); 2) autonomous agent architectures developed
since the 1990s in artificial intelligence, the most widely
used probably being the BDI architecture (see Section 4.2);
and 3) (comparatively) general-purpose architectures spe-
cifically designed for the creation of affective agents, such as
FAtiMA Modular and MAMID (see Section 4.3). Despite
important differences between these architectures, they
share some basic similarities. In particular, all of them can
be taken to describe goal-based (or goal-directed) agents
[57] rather than (merely) reactive agents (although reactive
behaviors can also be modeled); and all use symbolic
internal representations to represent the contents of the
agent’s mental states. Furthermore, none of these architec-
tures does anything on its own; it is only when they are
supplied with data (knowledge/beliefs, goals) and placed
in a suitable task environment that they “come to life” and
generate cognitive processes and behavior.
The main difference between the affective agent architec-
tures and the more traditional cognitive and agent architec-
tures is that the latter do not, in their original form, consider
emotions. Nevertheless, these architectures have been used
to model both processes of emotion elicitation ([68]; using
Soar) and the effects of emotion on action and task
performance (see again [68] for Soar, and, e.g., [160] for
ACT-R). This has beenpossible because both Soar andACT-R
contain, at least implicitly and in an approximate fashion,
central cognitive and motivational constructs needed to
account for emotions (see Section 2)—constructs relating to
the beliefs (knowledge) and themotivation (desires, goals) of
agents (for more detailed discussions, see [57], [65], [107]).
4.1 Modeling Emotions in Cognitive Architectures
Classical cognitive architectures such as Soar and ACT-R
are “echos of the original goal [of AI] of creating an
intelligent machine faithful to human intelligence” (Taatgen
and Anderson [193, p. 170]). At the same time, they are
attempts at theoretical unification in the field of cognitive
psychology (again [193, p. 170]).
4.1.1 Modeling Emotions in Soar
One popular cognitive architecture, that has also been used
to concretize emotion theories, is Soar [88], [123]. Soar is a
general cognitive architecture for human cognition realized
as a production system, the basic operation of which
consists of matching the contents of working memory to the
precondition of rules (see [164]). Following the classic work
of Newell and Simon [124] on the General Problem Solver, the
basic assumption of Soar is that intelligent behavior is a
form of problem solving. In Soar, tasks are represented as
problem spaces and problem solving consist of a search
(involving both automatic and deliberative processes) for
sequences of operators that will reach a goal state in
problem space. At each step in this search, Soar rapidly and
in parallel recruits knowledge from long-term memory that
is relevant to the current situation. After this knowledge
recruitment processes reaches quiescence, the decision
procedure executes a single most-preferred operator,
records its consequences to working memory or the outside
environment, and then recruits knowledge relevant to this
new state. If a problem arises due to the fact that certain
knowledge is lacking, resolving this problem becomes a
subgoal of the original goal. Soar is also capable of learning
about how subgoals were reached, and what the conse-
quences of operators are. It may be noted that considered
from the intentional stance [51], the operation of Soar is
essentially a form of practical reasoning ([29]; see also [65]):
Goals are desired states to be reached by actions; operators
correspond to possible actions, and knowledge about the
effects of operators correspond to means-ends beliefs.
Soar was not designed to model emotions; nevertheless,
two different computational emotion models have been
built upon Soar [68], [104]. These two models represent the
two principal alternative paths available to model emotions
in Soar and similar cognitive architectures, and they also
illustrate how the theoretical assumptions embedded in an
architecture can influence modeling choices.
EMA, proposed by Gratch and Marsella ([68]; see also
[107]), implements the cognitive process theory of emotion
proposed by Smith and Lazarus [182]. In EMA, the basic
architecture of Soar is left largely untouched, by imple-
menting appraisal processes as production rules encoded in
Soar’s long-term memory. In doing this, EMA exploits
Soar’s theoretical distinction between deliberative and
automatic processes to concretize a similar distinction
proposed by Smith and Lazarus between deliberative
(conscious) and automatic appraisal processes: Appraisals
are realized in Soar as “elaboration” productions that fire
rapidly and in parallel, and that bias sequential operator
decisions. Thus, by following Soar’s own theoretical assump-
tions, EMA achieves a tight and cyclical coupling between
automatic and deliberative appraisal processes in a way
that can be regarded as a computational specification of
Smith and Lazarus’s process theory of emotion.
In contrast to EMA, Marinier et al.’s [104] PEACTIDM
model introduces emotions into Soar by changing Soar’s
core architecture: Inspired by Scherer’s [166] theory of
sequential appraisal checks, PEACTIDM attempts to cap-
ture the sequential nature of appraisals posited by in that
theory by adding sub-stages to Soar’s decision procedure.
Specific appraisals are encoded into the architecture and are
associated with these processing stages. As a result,
PEACTIDM, like EMA, computationally implements the
assumption of a tight coupling between automatic and
deliberative appraisal processes; however, it takes a very
different path to realize this idea.
4.1.2 Modeling Emotions in ACT-R
ACT-R [5], [6] is another influential cognitive architecture
that shares many similarities with Soar; in particular, like
Soar, ACT-R is a production system with goals that operates
on symbolic representations. Also like Soar, the basic
operation of ACT-R is to achieve goals by applying suitable
procedures (actions). The differences between Soar and
ACT-R concern mainly a variety of design features that
together are intended to make ACT-R more psychologically
plausible than Soar in its original form ([6]; for a discussion
of some differences, see also [83]). These design features
include an explicit distinction between a procedural and a
declarative memory andmultiple modality-specific memory
buffers.19 A particular strength of ACT-R is its well-
developed model of long-term memory, in which informa-
tion is represented as networks and is activated by a
subsymbolic process of spreading activation (in fact, ACT-R
developed out of a theory of human associative memory). In
this sense, ACT-R can be said to represent an integration of
symbolic and subsymbolic mechanisms [160].
Although ACT-R has so far only been used to a limited
extent to model emotions, it deserves particular attention
because it is probably the best known cognitive architecture
in psychology and has been used to create precise
computational models of many psychological theories,
including several models of decision-making (e.g., [103]).
Ritter et al. [160] used ACT-R to demonstrate two general
ways of how some of the effects of emotions can be
modeled in cognitive architectures, namely 1) by varying
the content of the (procedural or declarative) knowledge of
the agent; and 2) by varying certain architectural para-
meters (as proposed by Hudlicka [76]; see also [77], [79]).
The first approach was used to model the effects of worry
on performance, by including a task-irrelevant production
in ACT-R that could fire at any time, simulating the effects
of distracting thoughts on working memory. The second
approach was used to model the effects of threat versus
challenge appraisals of a stressful task on performance, by
varying the level of randomness in the conflict resolution
process (which determines which production rule will fire
when more than one rule matches the goals of the system).
Other noteworthy applications of ACT-R to emotion
modeling are Cochran et al.’s [39] model of the impact of
arousal on memory, and Stocco et al.’s [188] model of the
Iowa gambling task, the main experimental paradigm used
to test Damasio’s [43] somatic marker hypothesis of the
effects of emotion on decision making. Although emotion
elicitation processes do not seem to have been modeled in
ACT-R, the similarities of this architecture to Soar suggest
that these processes could be considered in one of two ways
in ACT-R: 1) by modeling appraisals as production rules
(analogous to the approach taken by Gratch and Marsella
[68] in Soar); or by extending the basic ACT-R architecture
(analogous to [104]).
4.2 Modeling Emotions in BDI Agent Architectures
In Section 3.2, we discussed logical models of belief-desire-
intention agents and noted that, among other uses, such
models can aid the creation of corresponding computational
models. Here, we discuss the associated computational BDI
architecture (e.g., [30], [142], [143]). To recall, logical BDI
models are formalized theories of qualitative rational
decision making [29]. However, although these models are
precise renderings of informal intentional-level [51] theories,
they remain silent about the design level: They make no
assumptions about how beliefs, desires and intentions, and
the mental operations performed with them, are computa-
tionally implemented. BDI architectures, in contrast, (also)
address these questions: They are pieces of software that
implement the abstract principles of BDI agents.
The BDI architecture, which exists in several variants,
has become one of the most frequently used software
architectures for autonomous intelligent agents. The central
assumption incorporated in BDI agents is that actions are
generated by a process of practical reasoning [29] that
comprises two computational steps. In the first step, a set of
desires (goals) is selected; in the second step, the agent
determines how these goals can be achieved by means of
the available actions or plans [206]. Characteristic for BDI
agents, furthermore, is the separation of the process of
deliberation from the process of execution of currently active
plans. This allows BDI agents to balance the time spent on
goal and plan selection (choosing what to do) and executing
plans (acting), which seems to be essential for adaptive
action in resource-bounded agents [29].
Arguments in favor of BDI architectures as blueprints for
autonomous agents are their foundation in philosophical
(and psychological) theory; the existence of logical models
that allow to define, and reason about, BDI agents in a
precise manner (see Section 3.2); and the existence of several
software systems for programming BDI agents that are
close to these logical specifications (e.g., JAM [75]; JADEX
[136]; 2APL [44]; GOAL [73]). Compared to cognitive
architectures such as Soar and ACT-R, BDI architectures
are more abstract; for example, they do not require a
commitment to specific memory types. Depending on one’s
modeling goals, this can be an advantage or a disadvantage
(e.g., it is a disadvantage if one’s interest is to model the
effects of emotion on memory). Most BDI systems execute a
fixed perception-deliberation-action (sense-think-act) ex-
ecution cycle comprising the following steps:
1. perception of events;
2. updating of the belief and desire (goal) base (adding
new beliefs and desires, dropping false beliefs and
satisfied or impossible desires);
3. generating options (plans) (deliberating);
4. choosing the most suitable plan (generating an
intention); and
5. executing intentions (acting).
The basic BDI architecture has been extended in several
ways, either by modifying the agent’s internal processes or
by extending the BDI model to the social environment
(communication, multi-agent BDI systems). “Internal” ex-
tensions of the BDI architecture comprise the inclusion of
learning mechanisms, the consideration of personality
differences (e.g., [125]), and the inclusion of emotions.
BDI architectures are in principle well-suited to create
computational models of emotions given that most (at least
most “higher”) emotions are thought to depend on beliefs
and—directly or indirectly—on desires (see Section 2.2.3;
see also [74]). Furthermore, the formalization of emotion
theories in BDI logics discussed in Section 3.2 should
facilitate their implementation in BDI software systems.
Indeed, several attempts have already been made to
incorporate (aspects of) psychological emotion theories into
BDI systems (e.g., [20], [140], [141]). For example, Rank
[140], [141], has extended JAM agents [75] by including an
appraisal mechanism that compares perceived facts con-
cerning own actions and those of other agents (success,
failure, attempt) with the agent’s goals and computes
positive or negative “relevance values” on the basis of the
utility of the affected top-level goal and the match or
mismatch of the action-relevant facts to that goal. Successful
actions are additionally matched to standards [129] that are
19. Recent versions of SOAR (see [87]) incorporate many of ACT-R’s
features, including the distinction between procedural, declarative and
episodic memory, and subsymbolic processes such as reinforcement
learning and mental imagery.
associated with virtual goals to uphold them. If the
appraisal of an action-relevant fact exceeds a threshold of
intensity, up to three effects occur: The creation of an
“impulse goal” to display a fitting emotional expression, the
creation of a coping goal that may lead to a corresponding
intention (e.g., retribution, trying to hinder), and a change
of the evaluation of the agent who showed the action. These
“emotion-enhanced” JAM agents have been used to steer
the characters of a simple interactive drama featuring a
hero, a victim, a mentor, and a villain.
A somewhat different approach to enhancing BDI-agents
with emotions has been taken by Becker-Asano and
Wachsmuth ([20]; see also [19]). In the emotional BDI agent
Max constructed by these authors, an emotion system (a
model of the pleasure-arousal theory of emotion; [162]) is
added to the BDI architecture as a separate module that
receives signals from, and sends signals to, several other
modules. For example, on the input side, the emotion
module receives a positive signal if a goal is achieved,
which results in an increase in pleasure; whereas on the
output side, emotions (pleasure-arousal states) among other
effects generate beliefs about having them, amounting to
self-awareness of the agent of its own emotions. In yet
another “emotional” extension of the BDI architecture,
Lorini and Piunti [97] have modified the processing cycle of
the JADEX agent by including a surprise-based filter for
belief revision ([97]; see also [100]).
To allow the modeling of different emotion theories or
specific assumptions of different theories (see Section 2), it
would be useful if prospective emotion modelers could
more easily customize and extend BDI systems than is
currently possible. One way of achieving this would be to
break up the original BDI interpreter cycle into a small set of
processes that can be combined as needed [137], as well as
extended with additional processes. For example, it would
be useful to be able to extend the BDI architecture with a set
of basic desires from which concrete desires can be
autonomously derived [11], [99], or with a more detailed
model of memory similar to ACT-R (e.g., to model effects of
emotions on memory). Also, the BDI architecture could be
parameterized to allow the modeling of certain personality
differences (e.g., [76], [125]). In fact, some of the proposed
extensions are already being realized; for example, Ritter
[159] has enriched a BDI agent architecture with elements
from ACT-R in CoJACK.
4.3 Modeling Emotions in Affective Agent
Architectures
Several specialized “affective” agent architectures have
been developed by affective computing researchers. Some
of these are (relatively) general-purpose architectures and
thus suited to model different emotion theories. To
illustrate this approach, we describe FAtiMA Modular
[52]; [11] and MAMID [77], [79].
4.3.1 Modeling Emotions in FatiMA Modular
FAtiMA Modular is an autonomous agent architecture with
reactive and deliberative (BDI-based) behavior designed to
allow emotions and personality characteristics to influence
the agent’s behavior. It was created by refactoring a
previous version of the architecture [53] into a modular
version, consisting of a core that defines the general
processing cycle of the agent, and several specialized
components that are specific realizations of the generic
agent functions (e.g., specific appraisal computation and
action selection functions). The basic processing cycle of
FAtiMA agents, as well as several details of the architecture,
have been influenced by the EMA model [68]. The basic
processing cycle comprises the following steps:
1. perception of events;
2. on this basis, memory is updated and
3. appraisal processes are triggered;
4. an affective state is generated;
5. actions are executed based on goal-based planning
(a BDI-style reasoning process); and
6. actions are executed.
As concerns emotion generation, FAtiMA combines a
reactive layer that generates emotions on the basis of a set
of domain-specific rules with a deliberative layer that
generates emotions via an appraisal of the agents’ current
plans (see Section 2.2.3). The core of the deliberative module
is a continuous planner that was extended to include
probability information about actions and to perform
emotion-focused coping strategies. When an event is
perceived, active plans are updated and prospect-based
emotions (hope, fear, satisfaction) based on the agent’s
plans and goals are generated.
Different cognitive emotion theories (or components of
such theories) can be implemented in FAtiMA modular by
adding specific affect generation functions. Likewise,
specific action selection functions can be implemented by
adding specific behavior components. This philosophy is in
agreement with the “modular” philosophy of theory
systematization endorsed in Section 2. Recently, FatiMA
Modular has been further extended to include, among
others, an autobiographical memory for remembering
emotionally significant events, a module for basic motives
(adopted from Do¨rner’s [55], PSI theory; see also [12]) from
which concrete goals are derived, and provisions for
modeling cultural differences [11].
4.3.2 Modeling Emotions in MAMID
Similar to FAtiMA, MAMID [77], [79] implements an
extended sense-think/feel-act processing cycle. In this case,
the involved processes are:
1. sensory preprocessing (translating incoming data
into task-relevant cues);
2. attention (filtering incoming cues and selecting a
subset for processing);
3. situation assessment (integrating individual cues
into an overall situation assessment);
4. expectation generation (projecting the current situa-
tion onto possible future states);
5. emotion generation (deriving emotions on the basis
of a variety of cues);
6. goal selection; and
7. action selection (selecting the best action for goal
achievement).
The computations of each module are supported by long-
term memories represented as belief nets or rules. The
memories of MAMID agents can vary in type and structure
to reflect differences in individual histories, sensitivities,
and responsiveness.
In MAMID, emotional states influence processing in
three basic ways, the first two of which correspond to those
featured in Section 2.2.4: First, emotions influence the
allocation of processing resources and thus determine
indirectly whether a specific cue or situation is processed
or a specific goal is selected. Second, emotions directly
influence which goals and actions are selected. Third,
emotions can change the speed and capacity of the different
modules of the architecture. This effect is meant to model
system-wide subsymbolic (neuromodulatory) effects of
emotions. In addition, both sensory processing and atten-
tion are affected by global architectural parameters that
determine the speed and capacity of each processing
module, as well as the ordering of the constructs within
each module’s processing queue. Together, these para-
meters allow to model biases for each of the basic processes
(attention, situation assessment, expectation generation,
emotion generation, and goal selection)
A key objective in developing MAMID has been to
provide flexibility in the modeling of assumptions about
the generation and particularly the effects of emotions (in
fact, the primary focus of MAMID is on the modeling of
emotion effects on attention, perception and cognition, as
such effects have been neglected in previous computa-
tional models). The methodology used to achieve this
flexibility combines two ideas: 1) a high degree of
parameterization of the processes and structures that
comprise the different modules of the architecture, and
2) the modeler’s interactive access to these parameters and
their weights. For example, the valence (pleasure-displea-
sure quality) and intensity of emotions are computed in
MAMID as linear combinations of several eliciting factors.
The weights controlling the contributions of the individual
eliciting factors can be modified interactively by the model
developer. This provides a simple and quick way of
implementing alternative hypotheses regarding the elicit-
ing conditions of different emotions, as well as of tuning
models to reflect emerging empirical data. Similarly,
emotion-relevant individual differences (e.g., differences
in threat sensitivity) can be modeled by interactively
varying parameters. For example, in a stressful encounter,
a trait-anxious agent is likely to consider its competence
and degree of control, whereas a nontrait anxious agent
would not consider these factors. This methodology for
modeling the effects of emotions as well other behavior
moderators (e.g., personality traits, see [158]) has several
advantages [77], including the possibility to rapidly model
a broad range of distinct individual profiles and to
integrate the (possibly conflicting) effects of multiple
interacting emotions and traits.
5 CONCLUSION
The proposals made in this paper for increasing the
interdisciplinary exchange between psychology and com-
puter science, as well as the intradisciplinary coordination,
in the field of computational emotion modeling share
two overarching themes. The first is a proposal for
modularization: deconstruct emotion theories into basic
assumptions; modularize architectures. The second is a
proposal for unification and standardization: Translate differ-
ent emotion theories into a common informal conceptual
system or a formal language, or implement them in a
common architecture. In making these proposals, we find
ourselves in agreement with developments already under-
way in the domain of cognitive architectures. Specifically,
Taatgen and Anderson [194] predict that, given that
different cognitive architectures already share many iden-
tical or similar mechanisms, they will converge even more
in the future, as a consequence of which the choice of a
particular architecture will no longer imply strong theore-
tical commitments. Furthermore, by increasing the degree
of modularization of architectures, it will be possible to
build models out of components and thus avoid the
constraints imposed by fixed architectures. Analogously,
one may envision the development of a theoretical toolbox
of basic theory-elements, formulated in a common lan-
guage, from which theories of emotional agents (or of
emotion modules for agents) can be constructed.
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